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Comment

Back to the Future: The Revival of the
Theory of Nullification

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

American federalism, a system of dual sovereignty between the
national government and state governments, 2 is a "tale as old as time."'
Inherent in the dual sovereignty system is the issue that has been a
point of great debate since the very inception of the United States of
America: Which powers should the national government have and which
should belong to the states? 4 Indeed, "[e]lections have been won and
lost," "a Civil War fought," and, most recently, the federal government

1. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284
(1920).
2. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).
3. ANGELA LANSBURY, Beauty and the Beast, on BEAUTY AND THE BEAST (Walt Disney
Records 1991).
4. See Doug Linder, The Question of States' Rights: The Constitution and American
Federalism,EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftria
Is/conlaw/statesrights.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
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shut down over this timeless question.' With the exponential expansion
of the federal government and sharp political disunion over health care,
gun rights, marijuana use, and the right to privacy, among a plethora
of other issues, states' rights proponents claim there is no time like the
present for states to challenge the federal government's control on issues
purportedly within the states' domain.'
Recently, several states have jumped on board with this sentiment of
mounting a challenge, and stealing some pages from early American
history's playbook,' legislatures have been creating laws that declare
several federal laws void within their state's boundaries. For example,
Missouri recently introduced the Second Amendment Preservation Act,'
which sought to nullify all federal gun laws within the state as well as
criminalize federal enforcement of gun laws in the state, give citizens a
private right of action over officers trying to enforce federal gun laws,
and outlaw publishing information about gun owners.' While the
Missouri bill narrowly failed to become law due to the governor's veto,o
nine states have passed Firearms Freedom Acts (FFAs), which nullify
federal firearms laws with respect to firearms and ammunition
manufactured, sold, and possessed within the state's boundaries."
Marijuana is another issue about which state defiance of federal law
abounds. Since 1996, twenty states and the District of Columbia have
legalized the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.12 These states

5. Id.; Ian McCullough, Why Did the U.S. Government Shut Down in October 2013?,
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/10/03/why-did-the-u-sgovernment-shut-down-in-october-2013/.
6. See, e.g., Jake Grovum, Nullification:Old Arguments Against Feds Get New Life,
STATELINE (Mar. 14, 2013), http-//www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/nulliI
cation-old-arguments-against-feds-get-new-life-85899459254 (stating that "[1]ately, as the
number of issues spurring conflict has grown," such as gun control, health care, marijuana,
gay marriage, and immigration, "so has the tenacity of the fight" for states' rights).
7. See infra Part II (discussing historical examples of nullification).
8. Mo. H.R. Bill 436, 1st Reg. Sess. (2013) (unenacted).
9. Id.
10. Leslie Bentz & George Howell, Missouri Lawmakers Fail to Override Governor's
Gun Bill Veto, CNN (last updated Sept. 12, 2013, 7:07 AM), http//www.cnn.com/2013/09/11
/us/missouri-gun-laws-challenge/.
11. Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
FORBES

Wyoming have all passed FFAs.

See State By State, FIREARMSFREEDOMAcT.coM,

http://firearmsfreedomact.com/state-by-state/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (showing a map of
states in which FFAs have passed, been introduced, or are intended to be introduced and
providing links to information on each state).
12. See 20 Legal Medical MarijuanaStates and DC: Laws, Fees, and PossessionLimits,
PROCON.ORG, http//medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000881
(last updated Dec. 13, 2013) (listing states that have passed medical marijuana laws and
providing specific information on each state's medical marijuana law). These twenty states
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permit patients with a professionally determined medical need to possess
a certain amount of marijuana legally and, in some states, to cultivate
a specified amount of marijuana plants at home for personal medical
In addition, in elections in
use, without criminal prosecution.13
November 2012, two states, Colorado and Washington, defied federal
drug laws by passing measures to permit recreational use of marijuana
within their borders.' 4 State legislation legalizing marijuana for either
medical or recreational use renders a portion of the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA)15 invalid within the state under certain specified
circumstances. 16
These recent examples of states declaring specific federal laws
inapplicable in their borders have spawned a revival of the theory of
nullification, a state measure that declares an action of the federal
government to be unconstitutional and asserts that the federal action is
null, void, and of no effect within the state.' First used to oppose the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, 1 nullification has not been frequently
employed throughout American history, primarily occurring prior to the

are comprised of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id. In addition, Maryland
has passed a medical marijuana affirmative defense law, which affords protection from
fines and criminal penalties for citizens who successfully raise the defense that their
possession or use of marijuana was based on medical necessity, but the law does not
legalize marijuana for medical use. Id. However, the state may be poised to legalize
marijuana for medical use in the near future, as Maryland established a medical marijuana
commission in 2013 to request applications from state medical programs to research and
operate medical marijuana compassionate use programs. See Maryland Medical
Marijuana, NORML.ORG, http://norml.org/legal/item/maryland-medical-marijuana?cat
egory-id=835 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (discussing the 2013 law and stating that "no
state-sanctioned research programs are expected to be operational until 2015 or later").
13. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1427-32 (2009)
(discussing the framework of current state medical marijuana laws).
14. See Jack Healy, Voters Ease MarijuanaLaws in 2 States, but Legal Questions
Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/mariju
ana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html?_r=0.
15. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2012).
16. Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 5, 11 & n.42 (2013) (discussing conflicts between state marijuana
legalization and other provisions of the CSA, such as advertising marijuana sales, investing
or using money obtained from violating the CSA, distributing drug paraphernalia, and
attempting or conspiring to violate the CSA). The state marijuana legalization measures
are specifically in conflict with 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 844(a) that prohibit the possession,
cultivation, and distribution of marijuana. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a).
17. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173.
18.

See infra Part II.A.
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Civil War and then again during the Civil Rights era.'9 However,
recently the nullification doctrine has grown in popularity as political
disunion reaches new heights and as states respond to the expansion of
the federal government."o Interestingly, many of the modern examples
of nullification are tied to the enforcement of federal criminal law, a fact
that implicates concerns over the traditional state police power, the
doctrine of advance notice of criminal behavior, and even double
jeopardy. 2 ' This Comment will explore the modern revival of nullification with particular focus on criminal law. It will first discuss historical
examples of nullification, as well as the development of federal criminal
jurisdiction, which set the stage for nullification issues today. Finally,
this Comment will examine nullification measures with respect to
firearms and marijuana, assess the federal governmenf's response to
these measures, and gauge the future direction of nullification in
America.
II.

To THE DELOREAN!: A LOOK AT NULLIFICATION IN
AMERICAN HISTORY

Before we can grasp the importance of present-day nullification, we
must examine how nullification developed and played out in American
history. The nullification doctrine is "[tihe theory-espoused by
southern states before the Civil War-advocating a state's right to
declare a federal law unconstitutional and therefore void."2 2 Founding
father Thomas Jefferson is credited as the first to advance the idea of
nullification as a state remedy to oppose unconstitutional laws enacted
by Congress.' In reference to the timeless debate over the division of
powers between the two levels of government, the nullification doctrine
asserts that the states, as the contracting parties to the Constitution
that created the federal government, should be the "judges of what the
[federal] government might do."" At certain times throughout the

19. See infra Part II (discussing the development of nullification and its use throughout
American history).
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
21. See generally SaraSun Beale, The Many Facesof Overcriminalization:FromMorals
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005) (discussing the
concerns implicated by the overlap of criminal conduct by the federal and state
governments).
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173.
23. See Robert S. Claiborne, Jr., Comment, Why Virginia's Challenges to the Patient
Protectionand Affordable Care Act Did Not Invoke Nullification, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 917,
927-31 (2012) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's development of the nullification doctrine).
24. EDWARD PAYSON POWELL, NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES:
A HISTORY OF THE Six ATrEMPTs DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF THE REPUBLIC 50 (1897).
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nation's history, the states have asserted power through nullification to
challenge federal actions that encroached on areas of states' rights or
were unconstitutional.
The States' Response to the Alien & Sedition Acts
The first use of the nullification doctrine came as a response to the
unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 (the Acts)." In anticipation
of a war with France and fearing foreign infiltration, the Federalistcontrolled Congress passed broad legislation to restrict immigration and
citizenship and to silence opposition to the war from the DemocraticRepublican Party.2 6 The Naturalization Act of 1798" increased the
residency requirement for American citizenship from five to fourteen
years, required immigrants to declare their intent to acquire citizenship
five years prior to its grant, and rendered those from "enemy" nations
ineligible for naturalization. 28 Immigrants were the specific target of
two other acts under this legislation. One authorized the deportation of
immigrants deemed "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States,"29 and another allowed the President the power to detain or
expel immigrants from enemy territories by executive order in wartime."o The Sedition Act specifically targeted American citizens by

A.

prohibiting assembly "with intent to oppose any measure .

.

. of the

government" and by making it illegal to "print, utter or publish ... any
false, scandalous and malicious writing" against the government." The
Acts were a stark violation of the First Amendment's protections and
gave unprecedented power to the federal government."
Unsurprisingly, the Acts garnered a very negative response from the
American people." Because Marbury v. Madison" post-dated the
Acts, judicial review had yet to be established, and thus, was not a
viable option to challenge the federal laws." As a result, opponents

25. Id. at 18, 58-65.
26.

ANDREW BURSTEIN & NANCY ISENBERG, MADISON AND JEFFERSON 332-34 (2010).

27. Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566-69 (1798).
28.

Id.

29. Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570-71 (1798).
30. Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
31. Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, ch. 74, 1 Stat.
596 (1798).
32. See POWELL, supra note 24, at 60 (stating that the Acts were measures of
"dangerous usurpation" and dealt a "death-blow to freedom of speech and of the press").
33. Id. at 62-63.
34. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. The Alien and Sedition Acts, U.S. HISTORY ONLINE TEXTBOOK, http://www.ushis
tory.org/us/19e.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
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resorted to the state legislatures to combat the overreaching nature of
the Acts." Recognizing the Acts as unconstitutional, Thomas Jefferson,
then Vice President of the United States, and James Madison secretly
assisted Kentucky and Virginia, respectively, to declare the Acts invalid
within their borders.
The Kentucky legislature passed Jefferson's resolutions first on
November 10, 1798." In the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson used
strong language to assert the states' unquestionable rights as sovereignties to judge laws that violate the Constitution." Jefferson opened by
emphasizing the country's division over the role of the federal government; he wrote that "the several states composing the United States of
America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their
General Government." Drawing upon contractual imagery, Jefferson
noted that in the federal compact, of which the individual states are
parties, the states agreed to the creation of a federal government with
certain enumerated powers, and each state reserved for itself "the
residuary mass of right to their own self Government."' When the
federal government acted outside the realm of delegated powers, its
actions were "unauthoritative, void, and of no force."' Jefferson argued
that the federal government could not decide for itself what those
delegated powers would be because "that would have made its discretion,
and not the [Clonstitution, the measure of its powers."' Rather,
Jefferson proclaimed that each state, being a sovereign and a party to
the Constitutional compact, "has an equal right to judge for itself" the
extent of the federal government's powers, its infractions, and the
appropriate redresses." Emphasizing the Tenth Amendment, the First
Amendment, and natural law, the Kentucky Resolutions declared each
of the Acts to be unconstitutional, void, and of no force and strongly
urged other states to follow suit." Jefferson championed a "powerful
form of redress," whereby "the states had a natural right to nullify," or
declare null and void, any federal act that was unauthorized under the

36.

Id.

37. BURSTEIN & ISENBERG, supra note 26, at 337-38.
38. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 529 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003).
39. Id. at 536.
40. Id. at 550.
41. Id.
42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 550-53.
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Constitution." To Jefferson, "[niullification was a form of veto power"
that "belonged to each of the individual states and was to be exercised
solely within its jurisdiction."
Shortly thereafter on December 21, 1798, the Virginia legislature
passed Madison's resolutions, which espoused a more subdued redress
than Jefferson's nullification."
Madison used much of Jefferson's
contractual language to declare the Acts unconstitutional and to call for
interposition by the states.4 9 He wrote:
[I1n case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other
powers not granted by the said compact, the States, who are the
parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for
arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their
respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to
them.50
Rather than nullification, Madison proposed that states should interpose,
or mediate, over issues of constitutional violations on behalf of their
citizens, "open[ing] the door to negotiation."" Madison hoped that the
states would collectively decide and implement the appropriate action to
combat federal overreaching, such as that demonstrated by the Acts.52
However, the other state legislatures were not cooperative and either
ignored the Resolutions or touted them as incendiary." Nevertheless,
the unpopularity of the Acts helped to solidify the Democratic-Republican Party, which ultimately beat out the Federalists for control of the
federal government in the 1800 elections."
With the war threat

46. BURSTEIN & ISENBERG, supra note 26, at 338. Interestingly, the version of
Jefferson's resolutions ultimately adopted by the Kentucky legislature did not include the

term "nullification," as his early drafts had. See Barbara B. Oberg, EditorialNote to The
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 38, at 529-56 (discussing the evolution of Jefferson's drafts and stating that Jefferson
did not protest to the legislature's alterations or the omission of the tactic of nullification
from his resolutions).
47. BURSTEIN & ISENBERG, supra note 26, at 338 (emphasis omitted for style).
48. Resolutions of Virginia of December 21, 1798, [hereinafter Virginia Resolutions]
reprinted in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, at 22-23 (1850); see also BURSTEIN &
ISENBERG, supra note 26, at 339-41 (highlighting the differences between Jefferson and

Madison's resolutions).
49. Virginia Resolutions, supranote 48, at 22-23; see also BURSTEIN & ISENBERG, supra
note 26, at 339-40.
50. Virginia Resolutions, supra note 48, at 22.
51. BURSTEIN & ISENBERG, supra note 26, at 340.
52. Id. at 340.
53. Id.; POWELL, supra note 24, at 65.
54. See Jack Lynch, The Alien and SeditionActs, CW JOURNAL (Winter 2007), available
at http//www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Winter07/alien.cfm (stating that "[ainger over
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passing and the Democratic-Republican Party assuming control, the Acts
were repealed or allowed to expire during the following two years, with
the exception of the Enemy Alien Act."
While not directly successful in achieving their goals, the Kentucky
and Virginia Resolutions had a lasting impact on national ideology with
the concept of states as parties to a constitutional compact and the
vision of the nation as a league of sovereign states.56 These principles
served as the foundation for other nullification movements and later the
secession of southern states in the Civil War."
B.

The Nullification Crisis of 1832
Just as the American Revolution was sparked by taxation, so too was
the next major use of nullification. The growth of industrialization in
America following the War of 1812 caused a shift in the national
economy;" "the north was becoming increasingly industrialized," while
"the south ...

remain[ed] predominately agricultural.""

In 1828 and

1832, Congress passed tariffs to protect American manufacturingo and
in doing so, infuriated the southern states who believed that the tariffs
were only beneficial to the industrialized northern states." Consequently, southerners referred to these acts as the "Tariff of Abominations." The high taxes on imports caused the cost of British textiles

the Alien and Sedition Acts played a large part in electing Jefferson to the (Piresidency in
1800").
55. See Ally Hack, ForfeitingLiberty: A Collective Sense of Vulnerability and the Need
for Proactive ProtectionAfter 9/11, 2 CARDOzO PUB. L. POI'Y & ETHICS J. 469, 481-82 &
n.63 (2004) (stating that "the Enemy Alien Act remains valid law to this day" in 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21-24 (2012)).
56. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 76 (1999) (stating that "the less centralized understandings of
federal-state relations represented by the resolutions persisted and spread" throughout the
nation, particularly "the compact theory of the Union").
57. Id. at 76-80; see also Ryan Card, Can States "JustSay No" to Federal Health Care
Reform? The Constitutionaland PoliticalImplications of State Attempts to Nullify Federal
Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1795, 1804-08 (2010) (discussing the impact of the Resolutions on
later nullification movements and state challenges to federal action throughout history).
58. See Martin Kelly, Overview of the IndustrialRevolution: The United States and the
IndustrialRevolution in the 19th Century, ABOUT.com, http://americanhistory.about.com/
od/industrialrev/a/indrevoverview.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
59. The South Carolina Nullification Controversy, U.S. HISTORY ONLINE TEXTBOOK,
http://www.ushistory.org/us/24c.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
60. An Act in Alteration of the Several Acts Imposing Duties on Imports, ch. 55,4 Stat.
270-75; An Act to Alter and Amend the Several Acts Imposing Duties on Imports, ch. 228,
4 Stat. 583-94.
61. See The South CarolinaNullification Controversy, supra note 59.
62. Id.
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to increase drastically, benefitting American cloth producers in the
North." However, the tariffs burdened the agricultural South because
England's demand for raw materials produced in the South greatly
decreased, and consequently, the final cost of finished goods to American
buyers increased."
In this second historical example, yet another Vice President was
instrumental in calling for the remedy of nullification to challenge
federal action. Southerners relied on Vice President John C. Calhoun
from South Carolina for leadership and support against the tariffs.
While some felt so strongly about the tariffs that they called for
dissolution of the Union, Calhoun argued for the less drastic approach
of nullification, borrowing the concept from Jefferson." Because the
federal government existed only "at the will of the states," Calhoun
advanced that a state finding a federal law "detrimental to its sovereign
interests" had a right to nullify the law, declaring it void within its
borders.
Although Congress's 1832 tariff bill lowered the 1828 tariffs, southerners were still displeased and believed the tariffs were too high."
Because states' rights and nullification were increasingly popular with
southerners, a majority of states' rights and nullification proponents won
the South Carolina State House by 1832 and quickly called for the
meeting of a popular convention to discuss the constitutionality of, and
possible resolutions to, the tariffs." On November 24, 1832, the South
Carolina Nullification Convention reacted swiftly in enacting an
ordinance declaring that the 1828 and 1832 tariffs were "unauthorized
by the Constitution" and "null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this
State, its officers or citizens."7 0 The ordinance proclaimed that "it shall
not be lawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this
State, or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed
by the said acts within the limits of this State."" In declaring the
tariffs null and void within South Carolina's borders, the ordinance was

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

69.

Id.; WHITTINGTON, supra note 56, at 72-73.

70. An Ordinance to Nullify Certain Acts of the Congress of the United States,
Purporting to Be Laws Laying Duties and Imposts on the Importation of Foreign
Commodities (Nov. 24, 1832), reprinted in STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION 28-29, 31

(Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1834).
71. Id. at 29.
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essentially an ultimatum to the federal government to repeal the tariffs
and they even threatened secession. Indeed, South Carolina raised
over twenty-five thousand volunteer militiamen to prepare for federal
resistance.7 ' The ordinance and what ensued as a result, dubbed the
Nullification Crisis of 1832, has been characterized as "[tihe most serious
constitutional crisis faced by the American republic between the
adoption of the Constitution and the Civil War."74
Initially, South Carolina thought President Andrew Jackson might
support its nullification, as he had supported the state's Negro Seamen
Law" and Georgia's defiance of the Cherokees' treaty rights, "both of
which might well be considered forms of nullification."76 However,
Jackson proved the proponents of nullification wrong, feeling that
"nullification [was] a patriotic and personal challenge.""
In his
proclamation against the nullification ordinance, Jackson responded with
firmness, warning the people of South Carolina that nullification was "a
course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the
United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its
Constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union.""
To Jackson, "nullification was tantamount to secession."" He dispelled
the validity of nullification, characterizing the practice as "absurd,"
"impracticable," and "destructive" of the very purpose of the Constitution.o Jackson argued that nullification would essentially revert the
nation to its state under the confederation because the federal government would be powerless to enforce any laws on states and their citizens
that were not favorable to local interest." Jackson's duty as President

72. Id. at 30-31.
73. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 404 (2007).
74. Id. at 405.
75. Act for the Better Regulation and Government of Free Negroes and Persons of
Colour and for Other Purposes, 1822 Dec. Sess., ch. 3, § 3, reprinted in ACTS AND
RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA PASSED IN
DECEMBER, 1822, at 11, 12 (Columbia, Daniel Faust 1823), available at http://heinonline
.org.
76. HOWE, supra note 73, at 404.

77. Id.
78. Proclamation by the President of the United States of America (Dec. 10, 1832)
[hereinafter Proclamation of 1832], reprinted in STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION, supra
note 70, at 76.
79. HOWE, supra note 73, at 405; see also Proclamation of 1832, supra note 78, at 85
(charging that the nullification ordinance proposed by South Carolina's leaders was really
a pretense for their main objective of secession).
80. Proclamation of 1832, supra note 78, at 80-81.

81. Id. at 79-80.
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was undoubtedly to execute the law, and South Carolina was making it
clear that execution of the tariffs would require force."
Jackson
refuted Calhoun's characterization of nullification as a peaceful state
remedy; he warned, "be not deceived by names; disunion by armed force
is treason.""
Regarding South Carolina's challenge as a serious threat, Jackson
asked Congress to pass a law to permit his use of federal troops to
enforce the tariffs in response to nullification." Congress granted
Jackson's wish by enacting The Force Act 5 in January 1833, which
South Carolina also nullified." In the end, armed confrontation was
avoided when Congress, supported by Jackson's willingness to compromise on tariffs and his desire to maintain the loyalty of the South,
revised the tariff with a compromise bill of drastic reductions. 7 Much
like Kentucky and Virginia's nullification attempts of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, South Carolina failed to gather support from any other
state to nullify the tariffs." South Carolina decided to call the compromise a win and repealed its nullification ordinance of the tariffs."
While South Carolina's attempt at nullification also failed to reach its
objective and establish nullification as a viable measure, the ordinance
did have some practical effects in contributing to the federal govern-

82. HOWE, supra note 73, at 405; Proclamation of 1832, supra note 78, at 94 ("The laws
of the United States must be executed-I have no discretionary power on the subject-my
duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution. .. opposition must be repelled.").
83. Proclamation of 1832, supra note 78, at 94.
84. See The South CarolinaNullification Controversy,supra note 59.
85. An Act Further to Provide for the Collection of Duties on Imports, ch. 57, 4 Stat.
632-35 (1833).
86. An Ordinance to Nullify an Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled "An
Act further to provide for the Collection of Duties on Imports," commonly called the Force
Bill (Mar. 18, 1833), reprintedin STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION, supra note 70, at 37375.
87. HOWE, supra note 73, at 406-07; An Act to Modify the Act of the Fourteenth of July,
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Thirty-Two, and All Other Acts Imposing Duties on
Imports, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629-31. The compromise cut the former tariffs in half. HOWE,
supra note 73, at 406.
88. See HOWE, supra note 73, at 406-07 (explaining that other southern states
condemned South Carolina's nullification attempt because they fared better than South
Carolina under the tariffs and favored protectionism); see generally STATE PAPERS ON
NULLIFICATION , supra note 70, at 101-331 (providing the negative responses of numerous
states to South Carolina's nullification of the tariffs).
89. HOWE, supranote 73, at 408; Ordinance of the Convention, repealing the Ordinance
to nullify the Tariff Laws (Mar. 15, 1833), reprintedin in STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION,
supra note 70, at 352. Interestingly, South Carolina did not repeal its nullification
ordinance of the Force Bill. Howe, supra note 73, at 408 (stating that nullifying the "now
moot" Force Bill was the Nullification Convention's "final gesture of defiance").
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ment's willingness to compromise.90 However, many argue that South
Carolina's nullification was less about protesting the tariffs than about
protecting the institution of slavery." Consequently, when hostilities
between the North and South reached a head and the Civil War soon
appeared inevitable, the southern states opted for the more drastic
measure of secession over nullification, which had not been successful
with the tariffs. 92
C.

Slavery, Segregation, and the Modern Era of Nullification
While nullification has received a negative connotation from its
connection to proponents of slavery, abolitionists also employed the
doctrine to resist slavery prior to the Civil War." Several northern
states passed laws, dubbed "personal liberty laws," to thwart federal
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts of 17939' and 1850,9s which
had granted slave owners the right to recapture slaves that escaped to
the North in an extradited process and assessed heavy penalties for
interference with the law's execution.9 6 Pennsylvania's law directly
challenged enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts by making the
removal of an escaped slave from the state back into slavery a felony
within its borders.
These state measures borrowed ideas from
Jefferson and Madison's Resolutions, which proclaimed that the federal
government was not the final judge of its laws and that the independent,
sovereign states had a right and a duty to defy unconstitutional federal

90. See supra notes 87 & 89 and accompanying text.
91. HOWE, supra note 73, at 402-03 (discussing how Calhoun and his supporters
"wanted to try out nullification" as a tactic to protect slavery, an issue that South Carolina
had grown apprehensive about since the Missouri Compromise). See also John C. Calhoun
Statement on Nullification, ANDREW JACKSON: GOOD, EVIL AND THE PRESIDENCY, PBS,
http://www-tc.pbs.org/kcet/andrewjackson/edu/calhounonnullification.pdf (last visited Jan.
20,2014) (providing an excerpt from a letter in which Calhoun candidly explained "that the
doctrine of nullification aimed, above all else, at protecting the institution of slavery").
92. Howe, supra note 73, at 410; see also Ryan S. Hunter, Sound and Fury, Signifying
Nothing: Nullification and the Question of GubernatorialExecutive Power in Idaho, 49
IDAHO L. REV. 659, 679 (2013) (stating that "nullification sowed the seeds of secession, a
bitter fruit that would become ripe little more than a quarter century later" in the Civil
War).
93. See Hunter, supra note 92, at 679-86 (discussing the use of nullification by northern
states against the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793, infra note 94, and 1850, infra note 95).
94. Act Respecting Fugitives From Justice, and Persons Escaping From the Service of
Their Masters (Fugitive Slave Act of 1793), ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
95. Act to Amend, and Supplementary to, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 (Fugitive Act
of 1850), ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
96. Hunter, supra note 92, at 680-81.
97. Id. at 680.
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action." Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court became a big player in
the nullification efforts against the Fugitive Slave Acts by declaring the
Acts unconstitutional, asserting the sovereignty of the states, and
ordering the release of an offender of the Acts within the state." This
was the first time a state court had upheld nullification as a viable state
remedy against federal action."oo However, in Ableman v. Booth,'
the Supreme Court of the United States denied the states' right to
nullify the Fugitive Slave Acts and aggressively upheld the Court's right
under the Constitution to be the final judge of the nation's laws."o2
The ruling did not quell the northern resistance to the Fugitive Slave
Acts though, and soon the issue fell from discussion as the Civil War
began. 0 3
While slavery met its demise after the Civil War, the integration of
African-Americans into society became the next big battleground for
nullification. Unsurprisingly, some southern states found comfort in
their old friend, the nullification doctrine, when they sought to resist
federal action to end segregation in the 1950s and 1960s. 104 Several
southern states passed resolutions declaring the Supreme Court's two
decisions in Brown v. Board of Educationlos unconstitutional as a
usurpation of the states' power to operate schools and deeming the
decisions null, void, and of no effect in their borders."0 ' The terms
nullification and interposition were used interchangeably by segregation-

98. See Walter Coffey, Nullifying the Fugitive Slave Act (last visited Feb. 3, 2013),
http://waltercoffey. wordpress.com/2013/02/03/nulifying-the-fugitive-slave-actl(discussing
the northern states' use of Jefferson's language in their laws defying federal enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Acts).
99. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854); see also Hunter, supra note 92, at 682-83 (discussing
the role of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in nullifying the Fugitive Slave Acts).
100. See Hunter, supra note 92, at 680.
101. 62 U.S. 506 (1858).
102. Id. at 518, 526.
103. See Hunter, supra note 92, at 685-86 (discussing Wisconsin's nullification of the
Supreme Court's decision and continued resistance of the Fugitive Slave Acts up until the
Civil War).
104. See Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance-The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N.M.
L. REV. 167, 190-91 (1997).
105. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1]; Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown Il]. In Brown I, the Supreme Court rejected
the "separate but equal" doctrine and held that the segregation of public schools was a
violation of Equal Protection. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. In Brown II, the Court determined that the appropriate remedy was to order schools across the country to desegregate.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
106. See Hagley, supra note 104, at 190-91 (discussing Virginia's resolution to this
effect, which relied on the language of Jefferson, Madison, and Calhoun and which sparked
a domino effect of nullification resolutions across the South).
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ist states in the text of these measures and in their vocal support of
defying federal desegregation orders.' 07 In Martin Luther King Jr.'s
famous "I Have a Dream" speech,'o he proclaimed:
I have a dream that one day in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with
its governor having his lips dripping with the words of interposition
and nullification, one day right there in Alabama little black boys and
black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white
girls as sisters and brothers.'09
In 1958, the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the use
Unlike
of nullification to ignore desegregation in Cooper v. Aaron.'
the historical examples of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Tariff
Acts, violence erupted from pro-segregation riots as the federal
government would not compromise over segregation, and armed
enforcement headed by the federal government was required in some
states to implement desegregation."'
For the next forty years, nullification was largely non-existent, until
1996 when the modern nullification movement began with California
defying federal drug laws in permitting the use of medical marijuana
within the state." 2 The modern nullification movement has seen
efforts by states to combat the REAL ID Act of 2005,113 federal firearms legislation,"' the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010,u' and federal laws against marijuana use.116 While the states

107. Id. at 191-92 & n.175.
108. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address Before the March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963), transcriptionavailable at http://www.
archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf.
109. Id.
110. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
111. See Hagley, supra note 104, at 203-04 (discussing the Little Rock Crisis and the
widespread violence associated with desegregation attempts after Brown II).
112. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the modern medical marijuana nullification
movement).
113. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005); see also Card, supra note 57, at 1823-24
(discussing state attempts to nullify the Real ID Act of 2005 by passing legislation to
prohibit the law's implementation within its borders). But see Hunter, supra note 92, at
691-92 (refuting the characterization of states' defiance of the Real ID Act as nullification,
instead deeming the resistance as "uncooperative federalism").
114. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the nullification movement with respect to federal
firearms legislation).
115. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119(2010) (codified in scattered sections ofU.S.CA
tits. 25 & 42); see also Card, supra note 57, at 1795-99, 1824-28 (stating that thirty-six
state legislatures have taken action to thwart federal health care overhaul and exploring
the political value of nullification in state opposition to federal health care measures).
116. See infra Part IV.A. (exploring the nullification movements regarding marijuana).
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declare the federal government is overreaching in each of these issues,
with respect to marijuana and firearms, defiant states assert that the
federal government has encroached on the state's police power within the
realm of criminal law in violation of the Constitution.117
III.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR MODERN NULLIFICATION: THE
EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

The expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction is key to understanding
the modern nullification movement concerning areas of criminal law.
Federal criminal jurisdiction has increased exponentially since the
adoption of the Constitution."'
Originally, the scope of federal
criminal jurisdiction was very narrow, and the states were largely left
to combat criminal activity within their borders."' As the role of the
federal government has evolved drastically over America's history, so too
has its expansion into criminal law.'2 0
A. American Independence, the Articles of the Confederacy, and the
Constitution
Federalism was the main point of controversy in early American
independence and played a central role in the Framers' decision over
whether the new national government would have criminal law
authority.'2 1 The colonists were inherently wary of central authority,
an instinct that was "justified by the [English] Crown's long history of
abuse of the criminal justice system to serve political ends."'22 Consequently, criminal regulation by the federal government was a particularly sensitive issue of that period."'
At an even broader level, concerns of mistrust of the federal government were central to the great debate over the decision to ratify the
Constitution.124 At the heart of this debate was the worry that powers
given to the national government would correlate with a loss of
117. See infra Part IV.A. & B.
118. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39, 40 (1996) (asserting that federal
criminal jurisdiction has changed dramatically over the past two centuries).
119.

Id.

120. Id.
121. See Adam H. Kurland, FirstPrinciplesofAmerican Federalismand the Nature of
Federal CriminalJurisdiction,45 EMORY L.J. 1, 21-22 (1996) (discussing federal criminal
jurisdiction in colonial America).
122. Id. at 21.
123. Id. at 21-22.
124. Id. at 22.
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individual liberty.'25 Concerned with allocating too much power to the
new national government, the states first adopted the Articles of
Confederation,'2 6 which provided for a limited national governThe Articles of Confederation denied the new national
ment."'
government the ability to act directly upon individual state citizens, even
in criminal law matters.12 As a result, the new Constitution did not
provide for general federal courts, except for admiralty courts, and did
not establish any federal criminal-law authority.1 29
Although admiralty courts were well-established by common law, the
new national admiralty court "was highly controversial and was met
with extreme reluctance."3 o Ultimately, the Continental Congress
granted admiralty jurisdiction back to the states through an ordinance
allowing state governors to commission state court judges to try piracy
Although the Continental Congress made recommendaoffenses.'
states
on piracy laws, this approach lacked the uniformity
tions to the
a
needed to combat nation-wide problem."3 2 Later, in the development
of the Constitution, the Framers would expressly grant federal jurisdiction over admiralty crimes.'33
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government lacked
the power to handle issues of national importance.'34 Alexander
Hamilton complained that the Articles failed to give any teeth to the
nation's laws because the nation had "no power to exact obedience, or
punish disobedience to their resolutions."3 3 Thus, when drafting the
Constitution, the Framers wanted to create a stronger national
government, while still providing restrictions and balances on its
power.136

125. Id.
126. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union Between the States, reprintedin
ROSSITER JOHNSON, THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 241-255 app.
(1906), availableat http//heinonline.org.
127. Kurland, supra note 121, at 23.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 23-24.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Id.
133. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend.. .to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.").
134. Kurland, supra note 121, at 24.
135. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 21, reprintedin THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 101
(Oxford World's Classics, Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
136. See generally PAUL BOYER ET AL., t1:TO 18771 THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 191-198 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing how the failures of the
Articles of Confederation shaped the drafting and adoption of the Constitution).
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The Constitution provided for federal courts to have jurisdiction over
cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, cases in which the United States is a party, cases affecting
ambassadors and consuls, cases concerning federally-owned land,
admiralty cases, and diversity cases. 1 7 This jurisdiction was not solely
for civil cases; Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 3 instructs that all
criminal trials, except those for impeachment, should be by jury in the
state where the criminal conduct occurred. 138 Article III also established the federal crime of treason."3 ' The Constitution left the
business of creating the laws up to Congress; thus, the great source of
federal criminal jurisdiction lies within the powers enumerated to
Congress. 40 In addition, the Constitution and the laws and treaties
made under its authority were declared to be the supreme law of the
land and binding on the states. 4 1
The majority of the provisions in the Bill of Rights also pertain to
criminal law. The Fourth Amendment provides protections against
unreasonable search and seizure.' 42 The Fifth Amendment requires
indictment by a grand jury in capital cases, prohibits double jeopardy,
protects against self-incrimination, and provides for due process of the
law.' 4 a The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to a public and speedy
trial by an impartial jury, drawn from the place where the crime was
committed, in criminal prosecutions.'" The Sixth Amendment also
provides the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted by opposing witnesses, to compel favorable
witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel."' The Eighth Amendment
provides protections against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment.'4 6 Every other aspect of criminal law was to reside with
the states, as protected by the Tenth Amendment, which provided that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." 14 7

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
Id. art. III, § 2, 1 3.
Id. art. III, § 3.
Id. art. I, § 8, 1 18.
Id. art. VI, 1 2.
Id. amend. IV.
Id. amend. V.
Id. amend. VI.
Id.
Id. amend. VIII.
Id. amend. X.
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B. Federal CriminalJurisdictionPriorto the Civil War
Prior to the Civil War, only a few federal criminal offenses existed,
and these generally consisted of crimes against the federal government,
such as injury to, or interference with, the federal government and its
programs.'4 8 These mainly included such offenses as treason, theft of
government property, bribery of federal officials, perjury in federal court,
and revenue fraud.'4 9 At this time in history, the federal government
was small and operated very few programs.so Consequently, the list
of actions that constituted offenses for the protection of federal interests
was very limited.''
Generally, federal jurisdiction did not reach crimes against the person,
such as murder, rape, robbery, arson, and fraud."' The only major
exception to this was where the federal government necessarily held
exclusive jurisdiction, such as in the District of Columbia and the federal
territories.' 3 Rather, states held domain over crimes against the
person, as state law dictated and defined what actions would be
criminal, and state or local officials were responsible for prosecuting
these offenses in state courts.'a
C. Expansion of the Criminal Frontier:Mail and Mobility
The first federal criminal legislation came as a response to exponential
postwar growth in interstate transportation and commerce following the
In 1872, Congress enacted the first federal legislation
Civil War.'
dealing with crimes affecting private citizens-the mail fraud statute.'56 This legislation was a response to fraudulent schemes using
the mail, which jilted large numbers of victims over a broad geographic
area spanning multiple states."'
Congress also enacted new statutes to respond to transportation and
Initially, these provisions were
commerce through the railroads.'
narrowly tailored to a specific problem that local enforcement could not

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Beale, supra note 118, at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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handle, such as a provision deeming illegal the interstate transport of
diseased cattle, and gradually became much broader in nature with the
development of comprehensive regulatory schemes, such as the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890'5' and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.160
These new, broader federal statutes were highly controversial because
the federal government was encroaching into areas that had traditionally been the exclusive province of the states. In the 1903 case Champion
v. Ames (Lottery Case),1"' a sharply divided Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a federal law criminalizing the interstate transportation of lottery tickets. 1 62 The Court reasoned that Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce allowed it to enact this statute to assist the
states and supplement state law, which might otherwise be overwhelmed.1 3
Prohibition,the Great Depression, and the New Deal.
Prohibition, the Great Depression, and the New Deal brought more
expansion to the area of federal criminal jurisdiction. 6 4
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the sale or distribution of
liquor and explicitly granted "concurrent power" of enforcement to the
An extraordinary increase in
states and the federal government.'
federal prosecutions in the 1920s and 1930s resulted, with 65,960
Prohibition-related criminal cases in the federal courts in 1932.166
Despite the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, the expanded federal
criminal jurisdiction was here to stay.167 One reason for this lasting
effect was that, at the time, the nation was in the midst of the Great
Depression.16 8 As people were faced with extreme desperation, criminal activity ran rampant, and the states were ill-equipped to handle the
situation. 16 Congress responded to this nation-wide crisis by enacting
numerous federal crimes that targeted violence against private
individuals and businesses. 7 o Among these new federal offenses were
bank robbery, extortion and robbery affecting interstate commerce,

D.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012)).
Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Beale, supra note 118, at 41.
188 U.S. 321 (1903).
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 364.
Beale, supra note 118, at 41.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
Beale, supra note 118, at 41.
Id.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 42.
Id.
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interstate transmission of extortionate communications, interstate flight
to avoid prosecution, and interstate transportation of stolen property."' Other laws Congress passed during this time included a "kidnapping law, the federal securities laws, and the first federal firearms
legislation."'7 2 As the New Deal brought with it federal social and
economic legislation, Congress became more willing to assume jurisdiction over an increasingly broad range of conduct traditionally within the
ambit of the states' police powers."'
During this time, Congress also increased its comprehensive regulatory acts, which included criminal penalties."' As the government
became more involved in enacting federal regulations, the scope of
federal criminal laws expanded and reached a wide range of new areas,
such as "occupational health and safety and air and water pollution."175
In upholding New Deal legislation, the Supreme Court broadly
interpreted Congress's commerce power, extending it to local activities
that affect interstate commerce, and set the precedent for even broader

criminal statutes. 176
E. The New Age: Criminal Jurisdictionand Congress's Commerce
Power
The 1960s and 1970s began the new age of federal criminal jurisdiction. Congress began to rely heavily upon its commerce power to enact
criminal statutes dealing with organized crime, illegal drugs, and
violence, while continuing to impose criminal sanctions regulating other
social concerns.177
When organized crime emerged as an issue of national concern, many
believed that the federal government should help in combating it. 78
In 1961, Congress enacted the first organized crime statute, which
reached persons who traveled interstate in connection with racketeering
activity."' After a congressional finding that loan-sharking provided
a major source of funds for organized crime, Congress next criminalized
all loan-sharking in a statute so broad that it "could reach even the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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smallest local loan-sharking transaction." 8 0 Congress also invoked the
commerce power when it enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),' which provides heavy criminal and civil
penalties."

In 1970, Congress passed a comprehensive drug-control statute, so
broad in nature that it reached all controlled substances, even those
possessed or distributed exclusively intrastate.'8 Congress reasoned
that this broad scope was necessary because intrastate control was
essential to interstate control of drug trafficking."
Subsequently,
Congress added new drug crimes, such as possession near a school zone,
and increased the penalties for existing offenses.'" Congress enacted
criminal statutes dealing with currency reporting, money laundering,
drugs, and tax laws in the 1980s and 1990s.18 6
F

Violent Crimes and Other New Garden-VarietyFederal Offenses
With increased public concern over violent crimes, Congress passed
numerous criminal statutes in the 1980s and 1990s in the name of its
commerce power, such as carjacking and new firearms offenses.187
During this time, Congress also passed legislation targeting violent
career criminals and penalty-enhancement provisions with increased
mandatory minimum prison sentences. 88 In addition, a crime bill in
1994 "authorized the death penalty for more than sixty federal
offenses.""
Congress also reached its hand into garden-variety crime to combat
other social ills of the day by enacting new federal offenses for odometer
tampering, failing to pay child support, computer fraud, and disrupting
animal research laboratories.'
Because Congress simply added each
new statute to those already on the books, over 3,000 federal crimes are
now estimated to be scattered throughout the fifty titles of the United
States Code.'' This modern trend is a complete reversal of the limited

180. Id. at 42-43.
181. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012)).
182.

Beale, supra note 118, at 43.

183. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191.

Id. at 43-44.
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Now, the
federalization of crime in the first century of the nation.'
majority of the federal criminal code concerns conduct that is also
subject to regulation under the states' general police powers.193
Because the 'federal law generally supplements state law, creating
concurrent jurisdiction between the state and federal government,
conduct proscribed by both federal and state law "may be prosecuted by
federal authorities, state authorities, or both."19 4
This overlap in criminal jurisdiction between the federal government
and the state government invokes a host of issues, such as creating the
possibility of double jeopardy and disparate treatment for similarly
situated offenders, preventing the states from exerting the discretion to
respond to local concerns, and opening up the door for other potential
However, studies of the types of cases heard in federal
abuses.'
courts show that federal courts typically stick to their traditional role of
prosecuting crimes that implicate federal interests or that have
interstate components. 96 Thus, some critics dispel the overfederalization argument by purporting that "[tihe 'explosion' in the federal
criminal law . . . is largely irrelevant to actual practice in the federal

criminal justice system.""' While concurrent jurisdiction over the
same crimes is "generally benign," the overlap becomes cause for concern
"when the federal government criminalizes behavior that some states
regard as morally neutral or beneficial,"" such as in the modern
examples of marijuana for medicinal and recreational use as well as the
less restrictive use of firearms.
IV.

BACK TO THE PRESENT: MODERN NULLIFICATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

States are developing new norms in the arena of criminal law and as
a result are tying modern nullification issues to federal criminal law
enforcement, a departure from the majority of the historical nullification
examples.'99 In these modern episodes, the federal government has
declared as criminal an activity that the states have decided shall be

192. Id. at 44.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Kurland, supra note 121, at 2-3 & n.6, 9 & n.30.
196. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Overfederalizationof Criminal Law? It's A
Myth, 28 CRIM. JUST. 23, 26 (2013).
197. Id. at 25.
198. Id. at 28.
199. See supra Part II (discussing the historical examples of nullification).
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legal within their borders.20 0 Consequently, overlap in criminal
jurisdiction on these issues of division creates the scene for "a clash
between state and federal democratic processes." 201
The issues promulgated from these differences in criminality are
readily apparent: What law do the states' citizens look to in conducting
themselves? 202
The doctrine of fair notice10 3 becomes completely
convoluted when a citizen is notified by the federal government that his
actions may jeopardize his life and liberty and simultaneously assured
by the state that he is at liberty to so act without fear of criminal
consequence.204 In addition, enforcement causes chaos, as cooperation
and pooling of resources among state and federal agencies will necessarily be strained by each government's respective allegiance to uphold its
respective laws.2 05 In criminal law, arguably more so than any other
legal field, the ramifications of conflicting state and federal laws have
the potential to be great. Thus, the response from the federal government regarding this resurgence of nullification in criminal law is
imperative to the states, their citizens, and the continuing relationship
between the federal and state governments.
A. Puff Puff, Pass: MarijuanaGets the Green Light from States and
Feds
1. The Only Prescription is More Green: Medicinal Marijuana. The medical use of marijuana has become widely accepted across
the nation in the past two decades, as research has shown the drug has
a significant medicinal benefit in treating chronic pain associated with
terminal illness and in alleviating the side effects of standard treatments

200. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 844 (a) (2012) (criminalizing the simple possession of
marijuana, a controlled substance), with COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a) (2012)
(declaring that possession of one ounce or less of marijuana by persons at least twenty-one
years old is not a criminal offense in the state).
201. Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 29.
202. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, High Federalism:MarijuanaLegalization and the
Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 569-70 (2013)
(discussing the mass confusion caused by such a conflict in the law for law-enforcement
personnel, the courts, and state leaders).
203. The fair notice, or fair warning, doctrine is "[tlhe requirement that a criminal
statute define an offense with enough precision so that a reasonable person can know what
conduct is prohibited." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 676.
204. See Steven B. Duke, The Futureof Marijuanain the United States, 91 OR. L. REv.
1301, 1306 (2013) (describing the "chilling effect" of the federal government's ability to
prosecute marijuana users who are completely in compliance with state laws legalizing
marijuana use).
205. Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 31-32.
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for non-terminal illnesses.20 ' Several states have legalized the cultivation and use of marijuana, subject to numerous restrictions, when a
physician recommends such treatment for a serious condition. This has
been accomplished mainly through popular voter initiatives in earlier
years and with direct legislation later in the reform movement.207 In
recognizing the medicinal quality of marijuana and implementing its
legality, states are at odds with federal drug laws, which still classify
marijuana as a Schedule I drug-defined as one of the most dangerous
and addictive drugs in existence and as having little or no medical
value."o'
Medical marijuana laws work mainly to exempt people who use,
recommend, or administer marijuana for an approved medicinal purpose
from arrest, criminal prosecution, and civil penalties.2 09 While some
exemptions vary, the states use "a common framework for determining
who qualifies for them."2 10 With the emphasis on medicinal purpose,
first, a prospective medical marijuana user must undergo a medical
examination and be diagnosed by a physician with having a debilitating
medical condition.211 Conditions appearing on the list typically include
cancer, glaucoma, AIDS (or HIV), multiple sclerosis, and other chronic
diseases that produce symptoms like severe pain, nausea, seizures, or
persistent muscle spasms.2 12 Many states also allow patients or
doctors to petition to have new conditions added, and California's list
includes any condition for which, in the physician's opinion, marijuana
may provide relief.213
In addition to a qualifying diagnosis, all states require that a
physician recommend, rather than prescribe, the use of marijuana as an
appropriate course of treatment.214 This standard is generally easy to
satisfy, as all that is required is a physician's conclusion that among

206. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, ConstructionandApplication of Medical
MarijuanaLaws and Medical Necessity Defense to MarijuanaLaws, 50 A.L.R. 6th § 2, 353
(2009).
207. Id.
208. See Mikos, supra note 13, at 1433 & n.49 (internal citations omitted) ("To give
some perspective on the seriousness of this classification, consider some of the other
notable drugs that have been placed on Schedule I-heroin, Ecstasy, LSD, GHB, and
peyote-and a few that have not--cocaine, codeine, OxyContin, and methamphetamine (all
on Schedule II).").
209. Id. at 1430-31.
210. Id. at 1428.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also Zitter, supra note 206.
213. Mikos, supra note 13, at 1428 n.19.
214. Id. at 1428.
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treatment options, marijuana may benefit the patient.2 15 Almost all
the states require the physician's recommendation to be in writing, with
the exception of California, where oral recommendation is sufficient.21 6
Before lighting up, a majority of the states that have legalized medical
marijuana also require medicinal users, and sometimes caregivers and
suppliers, to register with the state.2 17 Failing to register usually bars
the person from claiming the medical marijuana exemption in a later
criminal prosecution, despite otherwise satisfying all the requirements
for medical marijuana use. 218 Registering involves providing forms
signed by a physician attesting to examining the patient, diagnosing a
qualifying condition, and recommending marijuana as treatment, in
addition to providing contact information for the user, the physician, and
the designated caregiver. 219 After the state has reviewed the registration application and confirmed the user's eligibility, the state will issue
a registry identification card, similar to a driver's license, for the user
and the user's designated caregiver.220 Users are required to renew
their registration cards periodically, usually every year, and are required
to report changes in their eligibility.221
Medical marijuana laws are not without limitations for qualified
users. 222 Restrictions on the amount of marijuana qualified users may
possess or cultivate at a given time are included in these measures and
vary from state to state.2 23 In addition, these laws include restrictions
on where or in what context a qualified user may possess or use
marijuana, such as in public places, schools, work environments, or
while operating an automobile.22 4
In legalizing marijuana for certain medical use, these state measures
provide legal protection to qualified users, their physicians, and their
caregivers for possessing, cultivating, using, administering, and
recommending marijuana.2 2 5 Participating states not only exempt
qualified users from arrest and prosecution for drug offenses connected
with this approved use, but many also exempt them from other civil

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1428-29.
at 1429.
at 1429-30.
at 1430.

at 1430-31.

546

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

sanctions, such as forfeiture, included in state drug laws.226 Designated caregivers typically receive protection from state-imposed sanctions
for possessing, administering, and even cultivating marijuana for a
qualified patient.2 " These laws also shield physicians from sanction by
government or private entities, like employers and licensing boards, for
making marijuana recommendations.2 28
Many might hesitate to classify medical marijuana laws as examples
of nullification, because none of these state measures assert that the
federal laws banning the use of drugs are unconstitutional nor do they
declare the CSA null, void, and of no effect in their state.229 Thomas
Jefferson's aggressive and righteous language does not resonate in the
language of these laws.230 For instance, the Vermont legislature used
passive language in its law, stating a preference for the federal
government to change the law to permit medical marijuana use. 23 1
Despite asserting its intent to join the efforts of other states in legalizing
the use of medical marijuana in clear defiance of existing federal law,
the Vermont legislature failed to legalize the drug's sale for medical
purposes, declaring that "[platients will be forced to procure medical
marijuana illegally until the federal government removes marijuana
from its list of schedule I substances or allows states to permit the
medical use of marijuana without violating federal law."2 32
However, some states are more assertive in their laws. Rhode Island
asserted its authority to enact its medical marijuana law "pursuant to
its police power to enact legislation for the protection of the health of its
citizens, as reserved to the state in the Tenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution."23 3 Regardless of the lack of explicit nullification
language, these state measures indicate that the state government has
the authority to except and legalize a provision of the CSA, essentially
rendering the federal law void with respect to medical use of marijuana
within the state. *

226. Id. at 1430.
227. Id. at 1431.
228. Id.
229. See e.g., John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the
Safeguards of American Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637, 1639-40, 1647-51 (2011)
(arguing that recent state laws legalizing medical marijuana "fall short of invoking the
clearly discredited doctrine of nullification" used throughout American history).
230. Id.
231. Vt. S. Bill 76, 2004 VT. AcTs & RESOLvES 135, Biennial Sess. (2004).
232. Id. § 1(e).
233. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-2 (2013) (emphasis omitted for style).
234. See 0. Shane Balloun, The DisarmingNature of the Wyoming FirearmsFreedom
Act: A Constitutional Analysis of Wyoming's Interposition Between Its Citizens and the
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Interestingly, federal response as of late to this growing trend in
medical marijuana has been largely laissez-faire, which has not always
been the case.2 35 Initial response to marijuana reform was staunch
opposition and included threats by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to revoke Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) registration and exclude any physicians
recommending marijuana from Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.2 6 From 2001 to 2005, the Supreme Court made its stance clear
in ruling against the permissibility of the medical necessity defense and
by upholding Congress's commerce clause power to prohibit the
cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with state law, even if
contained intrastate, and asserting the federal triumph of the Supremacy Clause.2 37 Despite these federal roadblocks by the Supreme Court,
states have not backed down from their medical marijuana legislation,
and even more states have since joined in legalizing medical marijuana
within their own borders.238
Early on in the current administration, President Barack Obama
declared that he would not "be using [DOJI resources to try to circumvent state laws" allowing medical marijuana use. 239 While President
Obama has received some negative press for recent raids on medical
marijuana dispensaries, "almost uniformly, these recent crackdowns
have targeted dispensaries that were out of compliance with both federal
law and [state law]. "24 In an interview with Rolling Stone, President
Obama qualified his early vows to not interfere with state medical
marijuana laws:
I never made a commitment that somehow we were going to give carte
blanche to large-scale producers and operators of marijuana-and the
reason is, because it's against federal law. I can't nullify congressional

Federal Government, 11 WYo. L. REV. 201, 232 (2011) (stating that even though state
marijuana laws do not assert to protect citizens from federal prosecution for marijuana use,
the simple act of passing a law that conflicts with a federal statute is a form of passive
nullification).
235. See generally Michael Berkey, Mary Jane's New Dance: The Medical Marijuana
Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICs J. 417 (2011) (discussing the history of
the federal government's response to state legalization of marijuana).
236. Id. at 429-30.
237. See id. at 431-33 (discussing United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.,
532 U.S. 483 (2001) & Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
238. See id. at 435.
239. See Amanda Reiman, Going Rogue: U.S. Attorneys in CaliforniaDefy Obama on
Medical Marijuana,HUFFINGTON PosT (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:01 AM), http://www.huffmgton
post.com/amanda-reiman/us-attorneys-california-marijuanaJb_4295573.html.
240. Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 30.
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law. I can't ask the [DOJI to say, "Ignore completely a federal law
that's on the books." What I can say is, "Use your prosecutorial
discretion and properly prioritize your resources to go after things that
are really doing folks damage." As a consequence, there haven't been
prosecutions of users of marijuana for medical purposes. 2"
Rather, President Obama claimed that there is a "murky area" in which
"large-scale, commercial operations ... supply[ing] medical marijuana
users" are "in some cases ... also ... supplying recreational users," to
which prosecutors cannot turn a blind eye. 2 Thus, for now, medical
marijuana use in compliance with state laws generally seems poised to
continue without interference from the federal government.24 3 However, as there is much federal resistance to change the CSA to permit
marijuana use, states face the possibility that practical acceptance may
be frustrated by defiant federal prosecutors or may come and go with the
changing administrations. 2"
2. Let the Good Times Roll: Recreational Use. In November
2012, voters in Colorado and Washington made history when they
approved the legalization of recreational marijuana use in their
Similar in form, these two initiatives repealed state laws
states."
criminalizing adult possession of up to one ounce of marijuana and
provided a one-year period for state legislatures to create regulations for
the licensing and taxing of retail marijuana stores."
In Colorado,
private cultivation of up to six marijuana plants, with no more than
three being mature, was also deemed lawful. 247 Both state measures
expressed a desire to treat and regulate marijuana in the same way
states do with regard to alcohol and clearly provided for the legal sale

241. Jann S. Wenner, Ready for the Fight:Rolling Stone Interview with Barack Obama
2, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 25,2012), http//www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ready-for-thefight-rolling-stone-interview-with-barack-obama-20120425?page=2.
242. Id.
243. Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 30.
244. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, MarijuanaLawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?,91 OR.
L. REV. 869, 880 (2013) (stating that one of the biggest consequences of the state of
marijuana legalization is "the ever-present threat of federal prosecution"); see also Berkey,
supra note 235, at 450 (explaining that the federal-state dynamic on the issue of medical
marijuana creates uncertainty and dependence on the mercy of government); Reiman,
supra note 239 (discussing this problem in the context of the raids on dispensaries in
California).
245. See Healy, supra note 14, and accompanying text.
246. Kamin & Wald, supra note 244, at 879 (citing COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(3) and
WASH. REV. CODE §69.50.4013 (2012)).
247. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3).
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of marijuana, which many of the medical marijuana laws problematically failed to do.m9 Both state measures contained restrictions on
what context in which adults may legally use marijuana, confining legal
use to private property and out of the eye of the general public.250
Nullification language is not readily apparent in these recreational
marijuana laws, just as such language is absent in medical marijuana
laws. However, the implications of these laws, even more so than in the
medical marijuana context, include nullifying an even broader portion
of the CSA with respect to the use and sale of marijuana.2 "' The
intent and purposes sections of these two initiatives are supportive of
this conclusion as well. For instance, Colorado's measure stated that
legalization was "[in the interest of the efficient use of law enforcement
resources, enhancing revenue for public purposes, and individual
freedom" and that regulation of marijuana was in the interest of the
"health and public safety of our citizenry," evoking illusions of the state's
police power.2 52 Washington's initiative asserted its intentions to "stop
treating adult marijuana use as a crime," refocus law-enforcement
resources on "violent and property crimes," and "[tlake[I marijuana out
of the hands of illegal drug organizations" through tightly regulated
state licensing.2 53
In a surprising and "historic step back from its long-running drug
war," the federal government claimed that it will follow the same
approach to recreational marijuana state laws as it does in the medical
marijuana context, remaining hands-off except in cases where individuals or organizations are acting out of compliance with state law.254 In
a memorandum sent to provide United States Attorneys with guidance
on marijuana enforcement, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
instructed prosecutors and law-enforcement officers to set their priority
for enforcement of marijuana laws on the following:

248. Id. art. XVIII, § 16(1); 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 3, § 1 (West).
249. See supranote 232 and accompanying text (discussing Vermont's failure to provide
for the legal sale of marijuana to qualified medical users).
250. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 29 (stating that "smoking will not be
permitted in public" by either Colorado or Washington).
251. Id. (discussing the conflict of these state measures with portions of the CSA); see
also Balloun, supra note 234, at 232 (advocating a broad definition of nullification that
includes the passage of state laws that directly conflict with federal statutes).
252. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1).
253. 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 3, § 1.
254. Ryan J.Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric HolderSays DOJ Will Let Washington, Colorado
MarijuanaLaws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Sept. 03, 2013, 6:12 PM),
http:/Avww.huffmgtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-doj
n_3837034.html.
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[(1)] Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
[(2)] Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
[(3)] Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is
legal under state law in some form to other states;
[(4)] Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used
as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other
illegal activity;
[(5)] Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation
and distribution of marijuana;
[(6)] Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
[(7)] Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana
production on public lands; and
[(8)] Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property."'
Cole expressed that outside of these eight priorities, "the federal
government has traditionally relied on states and local law enforcement
agencies" to combat marijuana crimes under state law.2 5 6 He further
stated that "the [DOJI has not historically devoted resources to
prosecuting individuals whose conduct is limited to possession of small
amounts of marijuana for personal use on private property."257 He
claimed that this type of "lower-level or localized activity" has and will
continue to be left to state and local law enforcement.2 5 8 Importantly,
Cole asserted an expectation that these states will "implement strong
and effective" methods for addressing any threats posed by the new laws,
qualifying this hands-off approach against hastily designed and
inadequate legalization schemes.2 5 9 While the plastic covering has yet
to come off these new measures, time will tell whether the federal
government will continue to be supportive of this growing trend of
marijuana legalization. 260 Based on what has happened with medical
marijuana, large commercial sellers and dispensaries would most likely
be the ones subject to the brunt of any federal action, while individual

255. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to all United States
Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
3052013829132756857467.pdf.
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2-3.
260. Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 29.
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users acting under state law generally would be free from federal
consequence.26 1

B. Click, Click, Boom!: States Up in Arms as Feds Shoot Down
FirearmsFreedom
With the recent growth in public shooting massacres, such as those in
Aurora, Colorado, and Newtown, Connecticut, there has been a push for
tighter gun control legislation by the federal government.2 62
In
on
the
have
gone
several
states
action,
of
federal
response to the threat
preemptive attack and have passed legislation nullifying federal gun
laws within their borders. 263 Nine states have passed laws, known as
Firearms Freedom Acts (FFAs) or Second Amendment Preservation Acts
(SAPs), which render federal laws regarding firearms inapplicable to
firearms and ammunition produced, sold, and used exclusively within
state borders.'" The language of these laws underscores the states'
belief that Congress does not have the authority under its commerce
power to pass laws on strictly intrastate firearms production, sales, and
possession. For instance, Wyoming's FFA states:
A personal firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition that is
manufactured commercially or privately in Wyoming and that remains
exclusively within the borders of Wyoming is not subject to federal law,
federal taxation or federal regulation, including registration, under the
authority of the United States [Clongress to regulate interstate
commerce. It is declared by the Wyoming legislature that those items
have not traveled in interstate commerce. %5
As support for the defiance of federal law, these FFAs typically cite
the Second and Tenth Amendments and use much of the contractual
language from the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, further indicating

261. See id. at 30-31 (correctly predicting the issuance of a memorandum on federal
prosecution priorities based on the historical treatment of medical marijuana and the
recent federal attitude of permitting state experimentation with marijuana).
262. See Jeff Mason, Citing Shootings, Obama Says Must 'Go Back At' Gun-Control
Push,REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/22/us-obama-gunsidUSBRE98LOOY20130922.
263. See Jon Terbush, The NullificationMovement: How States Aim to IgnoreFederal
Gun Laws, THE WEEK (published Aug. 29, 2013, 6:30 A.M.) http://theweek.com/article/
index/248902/the-nullification-movement-how-states-aim-to-ignore-federal-gun-laws("The
gun law nullification effort intensified . .. following the Sandy Hook Elementary School
massacre in Connecticut, as primarily red states, concerned that new federal gun
legislation was on the way, sought to head off Washington.").
264. See State by State, supra note 11. FFAs have been introduced in over twenty
other states. Id.
265. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404 (a) (2010).
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the intent to invoke nullification.266 Some FFAs provide for defense by
the state attorney general in cases where the federal government brings
criminal enforcement against individuals complying with state FFAs, but
they generally do not require such representation.26 7 A few states
made a bold move in their FFAs by even providing for criminal
prosecution of federal officers who attempt to enforce federal gun laws
and regulations on intrastate firearms.2 6 8 Missouri's attempted gun
bill, touted as "the most far-reaching states' rights endeavor in the
country," if passed, would have made it a crime for federal agents to
enforce federal gun laws and would have allowed Missourians arrested
under federal gun laws to sue their arresting officer."'

266. See, e.g., Idaho H.R. Bill 589, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 244, 2nd Reg. Sess., § 2
(2010) (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3315A), available at http-/www.legisla
ture.idaho.gov/legislation/2010/H0589.pdf. Idaho's FFA states:
(1) The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to the
states and their people all powers not granted to the federal government
elsewhere in the Constitution and reserves to the state and people of Idaho certain
powers as they were understood at the time that Idaho was admitted to statehood
in 1890. The guaranty of those powers is a matter of contract between the state
and people of Idaho and the United States as of the time that the compact with
the United States was agreed upon and adopted by Idaho and the United States
in 1890....
(3) The regulation of intrastate commerce is vested in the states under the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, particularly if
not expressly preempted by federal law. Congress has not expressly preempted
state regulation of intrastate commerce pertaining to the manufacture on an
intrastate basis of firearms, firearms accessories, and ammunition.
(4) The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution reserves to the
people the right to keep and bear arms as that right was understood at the time
that Idaho was admitted to statehood in 1890, and the guaranty of the right is a
matter of contract between the state and people of Idaho and the United States
as of the time that the compact with the United States was agreed upon and
adopted by Idaho and the United States in 1890.
Id.
267. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-405(c) (2010). Specifically, "[tihe attorney general
may defend a citizen of Wyoming who is prosecuted by the United States government for
violation of a federal law relating to the manufacture, sale, transfer or possession of a
firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition manufactured and retained exclusively within
the borders of Wyoming." Id.
268. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-405(b) (making federal enforcement a misdemeanor
subject to one year's imprisonment and a fine of up to $2,000); KANSAs STAT. ANN. § 501207 (2013) (making federal enforcement a felony).
269. John Schwartz, Gun Bill in Missouri Would Test Limits in Nullifying U.S. Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,2013), http*/www.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/us/missouri-gun-measurepushes-nullification-boundary.html?pagewanted=al&r=0. The Missouri bill ultimately
failed to pass into law. See Bentz & Howell, supra note 10, and accompanying text.
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The federal laws affected by FFAs and SAPs include the Gun Control
Act of 1968,270 which amended the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,271
and the National Firearms Act of 1934.272 Under federal law, no
person may engage in the business of manufacturing or selling firearms,
either inter- or intra-state, unless licensed by the federal government.27 3 Federal law mandates that all interstate firearms transfers
occur between federally-licensed dealers, restricts the types of firearms
that nonresidents of a state may purchase, and requires manufacturers
In addiand dealers to keep records of purchasers' identification.
tion, federal law restricts the types of firearms that may be possessed by
requiring the registration of short-barreled guns and silencers, taxing
such weapons upon transfer, and requiring every firearm to bear a serial
number. 275 Lastly, certain classes of people are prohibited from
possessing firearms under federal law, including users of controlled
substances, illegal aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from the
military, persons under a restraining order, persons convicted of
domestic violence, and persons convicted of, or merely under indictment
for, a felony.27 6 Because FFAs render these federal laws null, the
states are left to govern the manufacture, purchase, and possession of
firearms intrastate, which typically equates to fewer registration and
reporting requirements, fewer prohibitions on classes of people who may
own firearms, and fewer restrictions on types of firearms.27 7
From the beginning, federal response to FFAs has been resoundingly
negative. In 2009, shortly after FFAs passed in Montana and Tennessee, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE)
sent letters to local firearms manufacturers in the states explaining that
the state measures were invalid and that federal laws and regulations

270. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (restricting the ability to sell firearms to
registered Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs), requiring interstate purchases and transfers
of firearms to occur through FFLs, and requiring retail purchasers and interstate
transferees to register their purchases with the federal government).
271. Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938).
272. Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
273. 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2012).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 922(aX1), (bX3), (bX5), (m) (2012).
275. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5811, 5841, 5845(a) (2012); see 18 U.S.C. § 922(m) (criminalizing the
failure to keep proper records of transfers under the restrictions of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5811, 5841,
5845(a)).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), (5)-(9), (g)(3), (5)-(9), (n) (2012); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 25.125.57 (2013) (requiring a criminal background check on the purchaser for each retail
purchase of a firearm).
277. See, e.g., Balloun, supra note 234, at 204-05 (discussing the differences in federal
firearms laws and Wyoming's state laws and FFA).
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In response to Kansas's FFA enactment
would still be applicable.'
in 2013, United States Attorney General Eric Holder wrote a letter to
Kansas Governor Sam Brownback, in which he asserted that the
measure was "unconstitutional" under the Supremacy Clause, stated
that federal agencies would continue to enforce federal firearms laws,
and even threatened litigation for interference with federal enforcement.279
Unsurprisingly, the federal courts have not been supportive of state
law attempts to nullify federal gun legislation either. In 2013, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Montana's FFA was "preempted and invalid."28 0 An appeal to the Supreme
Court in that case was filed, but the Court recently denied certiorari,
declining the opportunity to limit the reach of Congress in regulating
firearms.28 ' At any rate, the conservative stare decisis in this field
seems heavily poised against any such limitation from the Supreme
Court any time soon.282 Nevertheless, based on what has happened
with medical marijuana, negative federal response is unlikely to deter
state legislatures from continuing to uphold and pass FFAs. *
V. FUTURE FORECAST: WHAT IS AHEAD FOR THE
NULLIFICATION MOVEMENT?

The future for the modern nullification examples of marijuana and
firearms seems set for two very different courses. Because acceptance
of marijuana has become widespread, at least regarding medical use,
and the federal government has asserted a willingness for state
experimentation in this field, state laws legalizing marijuana in defiance
of the federal CSA will likely continue to receive a more accepting,
hands-off approach from the federal government.2"' On the other

278. Declan McCullagh, ObamaAdministration TakesAimAt Gun-Rights Revolt, CBS
AM), http//www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-administration-takesaim-at-gun-rights-revolt/.
279. See Lois Beckett, Nullification: How States Are Making It a Felony to Enforce
Federal Gun Laws, PROPUBLICA (May 2,2013, 1:01 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article
/nullification-how-states-are-making-it-a-felony-to-enforce-federal-gun-laws (discussing the
contents of and providing a link to Holder's letter).
280. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2013).
281. Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1525 (U.S. 2014).
282. See Balloun, supra note 234, at 230 (discussing the likely fate of Wyoming's FFA
given the uncertain and historically conservative judicial review of Congress's ability to
regulate firearms under the Commerce Clause).
283. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the resilience of states in upholding and passing
nullification measures regarding medical marijuana use in spite of federal backlash).
284. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
NEWS (July 21,2009,2:50
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hand, the federal government appears unlikely to bend on its denial of
state legislation attempting to nullify federal firearms legislation, based
on the administration's steadfast history of unacceptance and the
growing pressure for gun control in light of nation-wide public shooting
tragedies.28

Many factors contribute to the different projections of these modernday nullification examples moving forward. First, time and experience
are vastly different in these contexts, as state marijuana laws have had
nearly two decades to develop and gain acceptance, whereas FFAs have
been on the scene for less than five years." Second, the scope of the
nullification is more favorable for the marijuana issue, as the marijuana
measures only seek to carve out a small portion of the CSA,"8 whereas
FFAs invalidate all federal laws and regulations relating to firearms,
accessories, and ammunition. 288 Another factor contributing to this
disparate treatment may be the tone of the state measures. 289 For
instance, state marijuana laws are generally much more subtle about
their nullification-stating a preference for federal action, asserting a
duty to the welfare of the state's citizens, and attempting to offer a
rational and reasonable approach to drug enforcement in areas of real
harm.2"o Conversely, FFAs are much more confrontational-asserting
that Congress's regulation of intrastate firearms is an adamant
overreach, directly stating that federal law will not apply, and even
criminalizing federal enforcement.29 1 While the Author does not
suggest that gentler words could cause an about-face for the FFA
movement, being directly confrontational and making felons out of
federal officers for doing their jobs is not going to merit a favorable
response from the federal government and "demands the state[s] decide

285. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
286. See Balloun, supra note 234, at 233-34 (stating that the DOJ has been known to
abandon federal enforcement when several states have acted contrary to federal law for
"over a decade and a half" and arguing that "[platience may be the virtue necessary" for
FFAs to succeed).
287. See supra notes 16, 208 & 251 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
medical and recreational marijuana nullification measures). .
288. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of gun
nullification measures).
289. See Balloun, supra note 234, at 234 (comparing the "hornet's nest" tone of FFAs
to the passive interposition of other nullification measures like those regarding the REAL
ID Act and medical marijuana).
290. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
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ahead of time what [they] will do when faced with a serious potential
conflict." 292
The nullification movement's effects on federal legislation concerning
marijuana and firearms will also be pertinent to how these areas of the
law move forward. If the modem nullification movement can generate
a change in the federal laws that it is declaring inapplicable, then the
problems posed by federal supremacy will become moot. As of yet, no big
push for changing these federal laws has come, and many believe that
this will remain the case. Consequently, the federal government wields
the ultimate power to choose whether it will enforce federal laws that
are in conflict with these state nullification laws. Although currently the
federal government has acquiesced in allowing states to implement and
police their legal marijuana use laws with little interference, this system
stands on shaky ground. Nothing restricts the next administration from
coming in and reversing this trend of lax federal enforcement in states
where marijuana use is legal. Susceptible to the whim of administrative
attitudes and policies, citizens in states with legal marijuana laws may
find their activities legal in one term and illegal in the next. Confusion
about legality, particularly when serious criminal consequences are at
stake, rather than clear, fair notice, is not how criminal law is supposed
to function. In addition, this method of allowing the executive branch
to determine at will what federal laws will and will not be enforced,
especially on a state-by-state basis, dilutes the fundamental concept of
federalism.
Interestingly, the marijuana and gun trends demonstrate that norms
at the state level are shifting towards increasing acceptance of behavior
formerly characterized as dangerous to society.2 93 The nullification
movement portrays the federal government as the old grandfather who
has not, and likely will not, catch up with the times. However, current
headlines point to a more welcoming view of marijuana by government
leaders. A news frenzy erupted when President Obama, who has
candidly admitted to using marijuana as a young adult, was quoted in
a recent interview saying, "I don't think [marijuana] is more dangerous
than alcohol."2" On the other side of the political spectrum, Texas

292. See Balloun, supra note 234, at 234, 237 (discussing the ramifications of FFAs
different, confrontational tone and advocating "a more subtle approach" for the success of
Wyoming's FFA).
293. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 196, at 28-32 (discussing the concern of concurrent
federal and state criminal jurisdiction where "the federal government criminalizes behavior
that some states regard as morally neutral or beneficial").
294. David Remnick, Annals of the Presidency,Goingthe Distance:On and Off the Road
with Barack Obama, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/repor
ting/2014/01/27/140127fa factremnick?currentPage=all.
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Governor Rick Perry made headlines when he made remarks supporting
the decriminalization of marijuana use."' Such remarks by national
leaders supporting an already growing movement can have a "longlasting effect[]" on the movement's vitality."'
Nevertheless, the Author believes in large part this dynamic between
the state and federal government regarding the shifting of norms is a
direct reflection of why the states, rather than the federal government,
were instilled with the general police power. State governments are
more localized and have a closer connection to their particular citizens
and the specific needs and problems of their distinct regions. In
addition, federal agencies typically rely heavily on states to aid in
criminal enforcement due to a lack of resources. Because states are
better able to gauge the needs and concerns of the citizens and are
mainly responsible for policing their regions, the states should be
allowed to implement changes in norms of behavior pertaining to
intrastate matters freely, especially in the criminal-law arena where
states have historically been in charge.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As norms regarding criminality of certain conduct continue to shift at
the state level, state legislatures will likely turn to nullification to
achieve federal acceptance. While critics and constitutional scholars
have stated that the nullification doctrine is illegitimate, history has
shown that the practical effects of nullification movements, despite their
technical invalidity, have been instrumental in alleviating clashes
between the federal and state governments. Although American legal
study would tend to agree with the statement that "[olur Constitution
is not some cheap Chinese buffet where we get to pick the parts we like
and ignore the rest,"2 97 the recent nullification movement on criminallaw issues has had the practical effect of giving the states a measure of
autonomy in deciding what will and will not be enforced within their
state boundaries.
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WASH. PosT (last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
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The federal government has shown acceptance of changing state law
norms by relaxing federal enforcement rather than reflecting compromise
by changing federal laws, leaving the experimental state laws vulnerable
to administrative changes of heart. As the state is turned into a
playground for testing out new norms in the criminal arena, the citizens
must play at their own risk in defying contradictory federal laws.
KEELY N. KIGHT

